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Attorney-client Privilege-
Admission in Legislative Hearings 
Joseph Lanza, while in the Westchester County New York 
jail, had an interview in the counsel room with his attorney. This 
interview was secretly "bugged" by state officers and a tape record-
ing of the communication was made. A New York State Joint 
Legislative Committee, with a view towards investigating the 
operation of state government, investigated the parole violation of 
Lanza. The Committee announced that it was planning to make 
public the recording of the interview between Lanza and his at-
19 The Nebraska Department of Insurance has stated that they would look 
with disfavor upon an attempt by any insurance company to contract around 
the Naphtali rule, should that rule be adopted in Nebraska. Conversation 
with Mr. Douce, December 27, 1957. 
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torney. Lanza and the attorney brought suit to enjoin the disclosure. 
The Supreme Court at Special Term denied a motion to dismiss the 
complaint and granted a temporary injunction. The Appellate 
Division reversed the temporary injunction and dismissed the com-
plaint. Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York. 
Under these facts the only issue was whether the complaint stated 
sufficient grounds for relief. The Court of Appeals held that there 
was no violation of the attorney-client privilege in the proposed 
use of the recording and found no grounds to enjoin the Committee 
action.1 
Appellants claimed that the use and divulgence of the recording 
would violate the attorney-client privilege under the New York 
Civil Practice Act, sections 353 and 354. 
§353 Attorneys and their employees not to disclose communica-
tions. An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to 
disclose a communication, made by his client to him, or his advice 
given thereon, in the course of his professional employment, nor 
shall any clerk, stenographer or other person employed by such 
attorney or counselor be allowed to disclose any such communica-
tion or advice given thereon. 
§354 The last three sections apply to any examination of a 
person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly 
waived .... 
In finding that there were no grounds for enjoining the Legis-
lature, the court said (1) the statute did not inhibit disclosures by 
other persons who overheard the conversation between an attorney 
and his client; (2) the statute seals only the lips of the attorney 
against testimonial compulsion and neither attorney nor client will 
be examined as a witness; and (3) the right to a fair trial is not 
, impaired since there is no trial, present or prospective. 
According to Wigmore the common law elements of the at-
torney-client privilege are as follows: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a pro-
fessional legal adviser in his capacity as such (3) the communica-
tions relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the 
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from 
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the pro-
tection be waived. 2 
The New York statute merely adopted the common law rule qf the 
attorney-client privilege. · 
1 Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Government 
Operations, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9, 143 N.E.2d 772 (Ct. of App. May 24, 1957), 
cert. denied, 78 S. Ct. 85 (Oct. 21, 1957). 
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (3d ed. 1940). 
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This section is a mere re-enactment of the common law rule 
and it cannot be supposed from the general language used that 
it was intended to change or enlarge that rule as it had been 
expounded by the courts. s 
In comparing the ele:tpents of the privilege to the facts of this case 
it is difficult to justify the result reached by the majority. 
The court relies first on the rule that the attorney-client 
privilege does not inhibit disclosures by other persons who have 
overheard the conversation. The court seems to be considering the 
tapped conversation as a witness who overheard the confidential 
communication. The reason for this rule follows from the basic 
concept that the privilege is that of the client. And because it de-
pends on the client, it is up to him to take the necessary precautions 
to assure that the communication is not overheard.4 However, Lanza 
had no choice in the facilities available; he made use of the only 
place possible to secure professional advice, the counsel room of the 
jail. "And the law does not regard it as necessary for the protection 
of the client, that his communications should be made to his attorney 
under any particular circumstances of injunctions of secrecy."5 
A comparable situation occurred in Coplon v. United States.6 
There a telephone conversation between an attorney and client was 
tapped by federal agents. The court said that this was a denial of 
the effective aid of counsel. Although the court based this holding 
on the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, they recognized 
the principle underlying the attorney-client privilege. 
It is well established that an accused does not enjoy the effective 
aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with 
him.7 
However, there is a New York case which holds that such inter-
cepted communications are admissible as evidence.8 At any rate, the 
telephone cases can be distinguished on the ground that the client 
3 Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 424, 28 N.E. 651, 652 (1891); Kent 
Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1952); 
Matter of Williams, 179 Misc. 805, 39 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1942). 
4 Cary v. White, 59 N.Y. 336 (1906); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2326 (3d ed. 
1940). 
Ii Wheeler v. Hill, 16 Me. 329, 333 (1839). 
G 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
7ld. at 757. 
s Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1951). The court 
said telephone conversations are not within the privilege, but here the com-
munication was not in good faith but in furtherance of a false reconciliation 
in regard to a divorce proceeding. 
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could have talked to his attorney face to face if he had wanted to 
assure that he was not_ being overheard, and therefore, the rule 
governing overheard communications would cover the situation. 
But where the client has done all that is possible to preserve the 
confidential communication- and it is secretly tape recorded by the 
state, the reason for the exception should not apply. 
A closer analogy arises when a client delivers a confidential 
communication to his attorney by means of a document and that 
document is subsequently stolen from the attorney. There is some 
authority to the effect that this situation is similar to the case where 
a party overhears the conversation and in both cases the burden is 
upon the client to see that the disclosure does not occur. However, 
the better view seems to be that the information does not lose its 
confidential nature. 
The principle forbidding its use is not adopted as a mere rule of 
professional conduct on the part of the attorney. It confers a right 
upon the client for his protection and advantage and which he 
alone is authorized to waive. It would not do to hold that the 
communication loses its confidential and privileged character if 
knowledge thereof can be obtained by means which do not involve 
the counsel in a breach of professional duty. 9 
This result is justified by analyzing the policy behind the attorney-
client privilege. 
It is absolutely necessary that one seeking to prosecute his rights 
or to defend himself from an improper claim have recourse 
to the assistance of professional lawyers, and it its equally nec-
essary, to use a vulgar phrase, that he should be able to make a 
clean breast of it to the gentleman whom he consults with a view 
to the prosecution of his claim or substantiating his defense against 
the claim of others. He should be able to place unrestricted and 
unbounded confidence in the professional agent and the com-
munications he so makes should be kept secret, unless with his 
consent; for it is his privilege, and not the privilege of the con-
fidential agent. 10 
The same principles are applicable to the case under discussion. 
The court, it seems, should have applied the privilege instead of the 
rule of the overheard conversation. 
Secondly, the court relies on the fact that neither Lanza nor 
his attorney are witnesses and that they are not being compelled 
to give privileged testimony. However, to have a breach of the 
privilege there need be no trial against the client, present or pros-
9 Liggett v. Glen, 51 Fed. 381, 396 (8th Cir. 1892). 
10 5 Jones, Evidence § 2156 (2d ed. 1926). 
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pective.11 It likewise follows that the attorney is not allowed to 
divulge the communication in a different action not directed against 
the client, without the consent of the client.12 To further show the 
importance of this principle, there is the rule that the attorney 
may not divulge this information even after the client's death with-
out the consent of the client's representatives.13 The reason behind 
these rules is that "there is no limit of time beyond which the dis-
closures might not be used to the detriment of the client or his 
estate."14 In light of these long standing rules it seems that the court 
has lost sight of the fundamentals of this privilege. 
Furthermore, this reasoning does not follow the comparison 
which the Court used in the argument pertaining to a third person 
overhearing the communication. There the court was willing to 
compare the tape to a witness who overheard the conversation. It 
would seem only a slight extension of their prior reasoning to say 
that the tape stands in somewhat the same position as Lanza ·if he 
were a witness before the Committee and asked to repeat what he 
had told his attorney. Would Lanza be compelled by the courts to 
disclose this information? The case of New York City Council v. 
Goldwater15 illustrates this problem. Certain confidential medical 
records were subpoenaed by a New York City investigating com-
mittee. Section 354 of the New York Civil Practice Act specifies 
that the privilege of clergy, physicians and attorneys applies to 
"any examination." In this case it was held that the privilege ex-
tended to a legislative hearing when the witness is under subpoena 
properly issued. This holding sustains the principle as developed 
by law that any disclosure of the confidence without consent is a 
violation of the privilege. The court said that the law is to be given 
a liberal construction, even though the normal application would be 
judicial proceedings. The court also said, "The Legislature which 
has conferred the privilege may, if it chooses, limit its application."16 
Unless the legislative action of this Committee in the Lanza case 
is interpreted as a legislative act limiting its prior act which granted 
the privilege, it does not appear that Lanza would be compelled to 
testify. There is no indication that the committee intended to limit 
its prior act. It therefore seems reasonable that the court in the 
11 Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528 (N.Y. 1848). 
12 Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330 (1862). 
13 Anderson v. Searles, 93 N.J.L. 227, 107 Atl. 429 (1919); 3 Jones, Evidence 
§ 750 (4th ed. 1938). 
14 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2323 (3d ed. 1940). 
15 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940). 
16 Id. at 302, 31 N.E.2d at 33. 
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Lanza case should have held that the use of the recording would 
be a violation of the privilege. 
The court remarked that it had no power to enjoin the Legis-
lature because it was about a legitimate legislative function. The 
question then arises as to just how far a legislature, within a legiti-
mate function, can infringe upon and possibly damage a time 
honored rule developed by the courts. When the privilege is claimed 
by an attorney or client in court and the privilege is made out, the 
court actually stops itself from using the evidence. In some instances 
the trial judge has enforced the privilege upon his own motion.17 
If this is the case why can the Legislature damage this court de-
veloped privilege without interference? Opinion of The Justices in 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire gives some insight into this 
problem.18 The court was considering the ability of the state legisla-
ture to make grand jurors disclose proceedings before them during 
their regular session. The court said, 
It has long been the policy of. the law in furtherance of 
justice, that the investigations and deliberations of a grand. jury 
should be conducted in secret, and for most intents and purposes, 
all its proceedings should be legally sealed against divulgence. 19 
It is not considered necessary in aid of the investigatory power 
that grand jurors should violate their oath of secrecy. 20 
In other words, exercise of the Legislature's investigatory power 
in this instance would have destroyed a traditional and vital element 
of the judicial process. The same reasoning should apply to the 
attorney-client privilege. Although legislative investigations rarely 
follow any strict procedure,21 it does seem that the informing actions 
of committees can fulfill their purposes without going to the point 
of breaking traditional and necessary judicial privileges. 
The organization of our government is founded upon the theory 
of a separation of powers between the three branches. No one 
branch is to usurp the functions of the other . 
.. . . the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the 
convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary authority. 22 
17People v. Atchinson, 40 Cal. 284 (1870); Beilfuss¥. Dinnauer, 174 Wis. 
507, 183 N.W. 700 (1921). 
1s 96 N.H. 530, 73 A.2d 433 (1950). 
19 Id. at 531, 73 A.2d at 435. 
20Ibid. 
21 Glassie and Cooley, Congressional Investigations-Salvation in Self Reg-
ulation, 38 Geo. L. Rev. 343 (1950). 
22 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissent). 
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This system is one of checks and balances so that no branch will 
become dominant and each has certain powers it can exert over the 
other. But where the system of checks and balances ends and 
obstruction or plain interference begins is difficult to ascertain. 
On the federal level the Supreme Court has adopted several self-
regulating rules to regulate its power of judicial review.23 The 
executive branch has not allowed Congress, in its investigations, 
to violate their rules concerning non-disclosure. On May 17, 1954, 
the President sent a letter to a counselor of the Department of the 
Army through the Secretary of Defense telling the counselor not 
to relate certain facts to the Senate Government Operations Com-
mittee. The President stated in the letter that he had done this to 
maintain the proper separation of power between the two branches. 
The Committee did not pursue the matter further than to accept 
the refusal of the counselor to answer under the authority of the 
letter. In view of the established doctrine of separation of powers, 
the court should have enjoined this disclosure. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The court put too narrow a construction on the statute in decid-
ing this case. 
2. The court takes no notice of the policy considerations behind 
the privilege and the result is that the holding abrogates these con-
siderations. 
3. The court is allowing the Legislature to obstruct and damage 
a court developed rule of law, which violates the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. 
If the courts will not protect this privilege in such a situation as 
this, the decision must be left to the discretion of the Legislature. 
The Committee must balance the interests affected by its action. 
It must determine whether it is better to do damage to a sacred 
privilege established by the courts or to secure the information 
sought to further the legislative purpose. Since the contents of the 
communication are not known, perhaps the Legislature has already 
determined this fact and the legislative purpose is the end to be 
achieved in this particular situation. But on the other hand, it is 
equally important that the court, in allowing such legislative action, 
does not open the door with a decision which will weaken the 
privilege and destroy its purpose. 
W. C. Nelson, Jr., '60 
23 Ribble, Separation of Powers, 6 Va. L. Weekly DICTA Comp. 1 (1955). 
